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Introduction
This text proposes to treat an important development which has taken 
place in the United Kingdom in recent years in the field of the employ­
er’s common law duty of care. It is proposed to analyse briefly the well 
established concept of the employer’s common law duty of care towards 
his employees which, until recently, applied generally only to physical 
injuries and illnesses. The development of this concept in recent years 
into the psychiatric field is a welcome step forward and shows how 
labour law has progressed and is progressing in the 21st century.
The employers' common law duty of care in respect of 
physical illnesses
The law relating to employers’ liability spans over a period of some two 
hundred years.1 In the modern common law the employer owes the
1 At the time of the British industrial revolution in the nineteenth century the courts were aware
50 J o  C a r b y - H a l l
employee a non-delegable duty of care.2 This means that the employer 
has to take reasonable care for the health, safety and welfare of the em­
ployee. Such duty to take reasonable care is automatically incorporated 
into the contract of employment whether or not it is specifically stated 
therein. Furthermore, the duty of care is owed individually to each em­
that their judgm ents affected the employer/employee relationship, particularly in respect to 
damages employers had to pay to their employees for industrial injuries. The insurance industry 
was in its infancy in those days and employers were not legally compelled to insure for their 
employees’ actions caused in the course of their employment. Being aware o f this heavy financial 
burden imposed upon employers’ shoulders, the courts encouraged employees to be responsible 
for their own safety. Hence the court’s decision in Priestly v Fowler (1837) 3 M&W 1, to in tro­
duce the “doctrine of com m on employment” whereby the employee took full responsibility for 
any injury sustained through the negligence of a fellow employee provided that the employer 
selected a com petent fellow employee. (Bartonshill Coal Co.v Reid (1856) 3 Macq. 266). It thus 
became an implied term  in the contract of employment of every employee that he/she took full 
responsibility for any injuries caused by the negligence o f fellow employees. It should also be 
noted that where contributory negligence was established by the employee, such contributory 
negligence was sufficient to prevent that employee from  bringing an action in negligence. (Senior 
v Ward (1859) 1 El.&EL. 385). As times progressed and being aware of the hardship which the 
doctrine o f com m on employment imposed on employees, the courts and legislature acted in 
tandem  to remedy that hardship. By the end of the nineteenth century the House of Lords (now, 
since October 2009, called the Supreme Court) in Smith v Charles Baker & Sons [1891] A.C. 325 
(H.L.) expressed its reluctance in certain circumstances to apply the doctrine o f com m on em ­
ployment. The com m on law thus introduced the notion of a non-delegable personal duty o f care 
of the employer towards each employee, thus enabling employees to bring an action for damages 
for injuries caused by a fellow employee. See Wilson and Clyde Coal Co. V  English [1938] A.C. 
57 (H.L.). By that time the insurance industry developed which enabled employers to insure 
themselves against such risks. By the end of the nineteenth century, the doctrine of com m on 
employment was held in Groves v Lord Wimborne [1895-1899] All E.R. 147, not to apply to torts 
of breaches of statutory duty thus enabling the employee to sue the employer for damages. By the 
middle o f the twentieth century, the doctrine o f com m on employment was abolished by the Law 
Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948. Furtherm ore, the notion that the employee who contrib­
uted to the employer’s negligence could not sue the employer was also abolished by the Law Re­
form  (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945. This Act perm itted the courts to apportion damages.
2 By analogy the element of “non-delegable duty of care” could have a statutory base such as the Man­
agement of Health and Safety at Work Regulations, 1999, where a duty is imposed upon the employer 
to institute a risk assessment. (See Uren v Corporate Leisure (U.K.) Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ. 66).
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ployee. In Paris v Stepney Borough Council,3 the House of Lords4 held 
the employer liable for not providing goggles to a one eyed employee 
(even though goggles were not provided to two eyed employees) who 
was injured in the good eye thus making him totally blind. The em­
ployer’s duty of care being an individual one, greater safety precautions 
needed to be taken towards vulnerable employees.
It is important to note that the common law duty of care is owed by 
an employer towards an employee and not to any other type of worker. 
The courts have battled over many years and formulated numerous 
tests in order to establish the distinction between an employee work­
ing under a contract of service5 and an independent contractor work­
ing under a contract for services. Limitations of space do not allow 
for a discussion on this important distinction and the reader is thus 
referred elsewhere.6
Although the duty of care is a single duty, that duty is divided for the 
sake of clarity into four limbs. To comply with the law relating to the 
non-delegable duty of care, the employer must take reasonable care (a) 
by employing competent staff; (b) by providing a safe place of work; (c) 
by providing machinery, plant and equipment which is adequate for 
the work to be performed; and (d) by running an overall safe system 
of work.
3 [1951] A.C. 367 (H.L.) See too, Coxall v Goodyear Great Britain Ltd.[2003] 1W.L.R. 536 (H.L.) 
(Asthma sufferer allowed by the employers to work as a paint operator. The employers were held 
liable for breach of their duty of care.); McDermid v Nash Dredging and Reclamation Co. Ltd. 
[1987] 3 W.L.R. 212 (H.L.) (A deckhand on a tug was injured by mooring ropes w hen the tug 
moved off w ithout warning. Negligence was attributed to the captain o f the tug. Although the 
Captain was not employed by the defendants these latter were held liable) and Payne v Colne 
Valley Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. and British Insulated Cables Ltd. [1938] 4 All E.R. 803. These 
cases show that the courts are prepared to take a generous approach with regard to the personal 
liability of the employer. See discussion by E. McKendrick in (1990) 53 M.L.R. 773.
4 As it was then called. Since 1st October, 2009, the House o f Lords has moved to new premises 
and has been renam ed as the Supreme Court.
5 A contract o f service is also known as a contract o f employment.
6 For a more detailed discussion see J. Carby-Hall, New Frontiers o f Labour Law: Dependent and 
Autonomous Workers, [in:] Du Travail Salarie au Travail Independant: Permanences et M uta­
tions, Bruno Veneziani and Umberto Carabelli (Eds) (2003) Volume 3 o f the SOCRATES Pro­
gramme. Cacucci Editore Bari, Italy at pp.163 to 308 and particularly at pp.246 to 282.
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With regard to the employment of competent staff it was held in Hud­
son v Ridge Manufacturing Co.7 that the employer, -  by allowing the em­
ployee over a number of years to trip fellow employees and carry out “horse 
play” which culminated in causing injury to the plaintiff, -  breached his 
duty of care despite of the fact that the employer knowing of these prac­
tices reprimanded the plaintiff on numerous previous occasions. The 
employer should have taken stronger disciplinary measures to stop these 
practices from occurring. Part of the employer’s duty of care is to keep 
the workplace safe.8 In Latimer v A.E.C. Ltd.9 the employer was held to 
have exercised a reasonable duty of care when, as a result of an unusually 
heavy rain storm, the floor of the factory was flooded. The plaintiff slipped 
and injured himself. The employer had acted reasonably in the circum­
stance when sawdust and sand were applied to the floors.10 The third limb 
of the duty of care is the provision and maintenance of adequate plant, 
machinery and tools for the work to be performed in a safe manner. The 
employer’s duty is not such that the latest equipment should be purchased. 
So long as the equipment is safe for the job it is to perform and is prop­
erly maintained, this would be sufficient to meet the requirements of the 
law which provides for a reasonable duty of care. In Davie v New Merton 
Board Mills Ltd.11their Lordships held that the employer had not breached 
his duty of care when a metal particle from a machine hit the plaintiff’s 
left eye which made him lose his sight. That machine had been bought 
from a reputable supplier and having had a latent defect the employer was 
not to know, upon reasonable inspection, of that defect.12 Davies case has
7 [1957] 2 Q.B. 348. Cf. Smith v Crossley Brothers Ltd. (1951) Sol. Jo. 655. See too Speed v Swift 
(Thomas) and Co. Ltd. [1943] 1 All E.R. 539.
8 See Ashdown v Samuel Williams & Sons. Ltd. [1956] 3 W.L.R. 1104 (C.A.) See too Lord Porter’s 
dictum  in London Graving Dock Co. V  Horton [1951] 2 All.E.R.1 at p 5 where he emphasises the 
fact that the employer’s duty o f care owed to the employee is higher that that owed to an invitee.
9 [1952] 2 Q.B. 701.
10 See too Donachey v Boulton and Paul Ltd.[1967] K.I.R. 787 (H.L.).
11 [1959] 2 W.L.R. 331 (H.L.).
12 See the constructive criticism made by C.J. Ham son in (1959) C.L.J. 157.and B.A. Hepple (1970) 
C.L.J. 25 See too Davidson v Handley Page Ltd. [1945] 1 All E.R. 235 (C.A.) where it was held 
that the obligation o f the employer to provide safe appliances covers all acts which are reasonably 
incidental to the daily work.
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been reversed by statute some years later thus making the employer liable 
in such circumstances.13 The employee may still bring an action against 
the manufacturer if he/she can prove (i) that the defective equipment was 
the cause of the accident and (ii) that on the balance of probabilities the 
defect, whether patent or latent, was due to the fault of the manufacturer. 
The 1969 Act confirms that the rules relating to contributory negligence 
apply.14 The fourth limb of the employer’s duty of care treats the provision 
of a safe system of work. The employer has a duty to take reasonable care in 
supervising the work performed by the employee and organise the meth­
od in which the work is to be performed. This includes giving employees 
adequate training, proper and clear instructions and guidance. Further­
more the employer has a duty to see that all instructions are followed. The 
more dangerous and complex the work, the greater is the employer’s duty 
of care to provide a system of work which is safe. In General Cleaning Con­
tractors v Christmas15 the employer was held liable for not providing a safe 
system of work when proper instructions were not given to window clean­
ers who were standing on window sills while cleaning the outside part of 
a sash window and when a sash broke causing the window to shut abruptly 
thus causing injury to the cleaner.16
13 This House o f Lords case has since been reversed by the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equip­
ment) Act 1969 which provides that where an employee is injured in the course o f his employ­
m ent by defective equipm ent which has been purchased by the employer for the purposes o f the 
employer’s business and the defect is due either wholly or partly to the fault o f an identified or 
unidentified third party (e.g. the manufacturer) the fault will nevertheless be deemed to be that 
of the employer. M achinery covered extends to plant, aircraft, vehicles, clothing,, sunken ships 
(Coltman v Bibby Tankers Ltd. (The Derbyshire) [1988] 3 W.L.R. 11h1 (H.L.)) and flagstones 
which broke and injured the plaintiff (Knowles v Liverpool City Council [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1428). 
See too Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 S. 1 (1) (3).
14 Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act, 1969 S 1(1) (b).
15 [1953] A.C. 180 (H.L.).
16 See too Drum m ond v British Building Cleaners Ltd. [1954] 3 All E.R. 507 and Smith v Austin  
Lifts Ltd. [1959] 1 All E.R. 81. (the employer m ust take reasonable care depending upon the cir­
cumstances).; Woods v Durable Suites Ltd. [1953] 2 All E.R. 391 (allowances to be made for the 
imperfections o f hum an nature); Rees v Cambrian Wagon Works Ltd. 91964) L.T. 220.( work of 
a complicated or unusual character); Olsen v Corry & Gravesend Aviation Ltd  [1936] 3 All E.R. 
241 (apprentice’s imperfect system of instruction); James v Hepworth & Grandage Ltd. [1967] 
K.I.R. 809 (C.A.) (the bringing to the attention of employees protective spats/clothing); Bell v 
Arnott 7 Harrison Ltd. [1967] 2 K.I.R. 825 (C.A.) (regular inspections of electric drills require­
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The employers' common law duty of care with respect 
to psychiatric illnesses
From the brief discussion which has taken place above it will be read­
ily be noticed that breach of the employer’s common law duty of care 
towards employees related mainly to physical injuries. The reason is 
that, until recently, little was known about psychiatric illnesses. With 
the advance in medical science relating to psychiatric illnesses, a sig­
nificant amount of jurisprudence treating such illnesses has developed 
in the last twenty five years.
In applying the general rules of the employer’s liability, Coleman J. 
in Walker v Northumberland County Council17 held that the employ­
er’s common law duty of care could be extended to cover psychological 
illnesses.18 In Walker, the employee suffered two nervous breakdowns 
because of stress at work. The employer should have foreseen after the 
first nervous breakdown of a second one occurring. The employer should 
thus have taken measures to reduce the employee’s workload. The deci­
sion in Walker was confirmed in the leading Court of Appeal case of
m ent to m eet the standard o f care needed.). The degree of care which the duty involves m ust be 
proportionate to the degree o f risk. (See Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v London Guarantee and Ac­
cident Co. Ltd. [1936] A.C. 108.) Some cases have dealt with situations in which it was difficult to 
determ ine whether there was a duty owed to the employee who is injured and how stringent the 
duty was.(In Williams v Grimshaw et al. [1968] 3 K.I.R. 610 the stewardess o f a cricket club was 
injured by robbers while she was carrying money. It was held that the employers where under 
a duty not to expose her to unnecessary risk, including the risk o f injury by criminals, but that 
in this case they had taken reasonable care for the stewardess’s safety. In Houghton v Hackney 
Borough Council [1968] 3 K.I.R. 615 a rent collector was injured by robbers and the issue was 
whether the employee was properly protected while collecting rents. The court held that the 
employers were under a duty to take reasonable care to prevent unnecessary risks including 
criminal injury risks but that they discharged their duty in this case. See too Cook v Broderip 
The Times 27th February, 1968 (cleaner injured by an electric fire while cleaning a flat where the 
employer was held not liable as a com petent electrician was employed).
17 [1995]1 All E.R. 737.
18 For a detailed analysis regarding psychiatric illnesses see J. Carby-Hall, M ental Illnesses: The 
British Labour Law Experience [in:] Prawo Pracy w Świetle Procesów Integracji Europejskiej -  
Księga jubileuszowa Professor Marii Matey-Tyrowicz, eds. J. Wratny, M. Rycak, Wolters Kluwer, 
Warszawa 2011, at pp. 322 to 363. See too a com m entary on Walker’s case by D. N olan (1995) 
24 I.L.J. 660.
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Sutherland v Hatton19 in the guidance given to employers by Hale L.J.20 
One of the guidelines given by her ladyship was that the employer is en­
titled to presume that the employee is able to cope with stress or harass­
ment at work unless he knows, or ought to know, otherwise.21 In Hutton, 
the plaintiff, a comprehensive school teacher, suffered from a psychiatric 
illness caused by stress at work. The plaintiff never complained nor asked 
for assistance from the school and therefore kept the stress she was ex­
periencing a secret. Since the employers were not aware of the situation 
they were held to be not liable for breach of their duty of care. In Barber 
v Somerset County Council22 however, where the facts were similar to 
Hattons case, the House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal’s deci­
sion and found for the plaintiff. The brief facts of this case were that the 
plaintiffwho was a teacher suffered from a mental breakdown and given 
a sick note by his general practitioner stating that the plaintiff was suffer­
ing from depression caused by stress at work and recommended a three 
week period of sick leave. On several previous occasions the plaintiff had 
also expressed his concerns that his workload was affecting his health. 
The distinction between the Hutton and Barber decisions was that in the 
former case Mrs Hutton had not complained to her employer about her 
stress and her psychiatric illness. The employer could thus not have fore­
seen the consequences. In Barber however, the employers having been 
alerted, they were held to be in breach of their common law duty of care 
(in negligence) for not taking appropriate action to remedy or ease the 
plaintiff’s stress and to make the necessary inquiries. Lord Walker made 
it clear in his judgment that the reasonable and prudent employer .. 
ought to address the safety of his workers23 in the light of what he knows 
or ought to know”.
19 [2002] 2 All E.R. 1 (C.A.).
20 See J. Carby-Hall op. cit. at pp. 344 to 346.
21 See ibidem at p. 345. See too N.J. Mullany, Containing claims for workplace mental illness (2002) 
118 L.Q.R. 373.
22 [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1089 (H.L.).
23 Footnote inserted by the author to point out that the employer’s com m on law duty o f care 
applies to the “employee” and not the “worker” His lordship appears to have slipped up in his 
terminology! See J. Carby-Hall, op. cit. SOCRATES Program m e (footnote 6 above).
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Lest the reader should find any inconsistency between the Hatton 
and Barber decisions, Scott- Baker L.J. in the Court of Appeal in Hart­
man v South Sussex Mental Health and Community Care NHS Trust24 
made it clear that Hale L.J.’s guidelines(in Hatton) were accepted by 
Lord walker (in Barber) but that each case relating to the common law 
duty of care, had to be decided upon its own facts and merits based 
on what a reasonable employer should, or ought to, know about the 
employee’s psychiatric health.25
A concluding thought
It is gratifying to note the important progress which has taken place at 
common law in recent years! The well established employer’s liability for 
breach of his common law duty of care owed to his employees for phys­
ical injuries has now been extended to psychiatric illnesses and injuries.
The test to be applied in the case of psychiatric injury/illnesses is 
that of foreseeability of a negative reaction which the employee, seen as 
an individual, might suffer because of work pressures such as stress and 
harassment. The employer has to take reasonable measures to prevent 
physical and psychiatric illnesses/and injuries from occurring. What is
24 [2005] I.C.R.782 (C.A.).
25 The C ourt o f Appeal in the Hartman case (a joint action brought before the C ourt of Appeal 
by six plaintiffs) dismissed one of the cases on the grounds that the employer o f a nursing aux­
iliary assisting children with learning difficulties (a) did not owe his employees a higher duty of 
care than in other occupations and (b) the fact that the employee reported in confidence to the 
Occupational Health D epartm ent the fact that she suffered a nervous breakdown on a previous 
occasion does not m ean that the employer did know, or ought to have known, of the employee’s 
psychiatric illness. In  contrast the sixth appeal was upheld in Melville v Home Office because the 
employers agreed that they breached their duty of care in that a reasonable person would have 
foreseen psychiatric illnesses occurring in those circumstances. These circumstances were that 
it was foreseeable that a prison healthcare officer, one of whose jobs was to recover the bodies 
of prisoners who com m itted suicide, needed the necessary support. Although such support was 
available, it was not made available to the plaintiff. Scott-Baker L.J. posited “It is illogical to argue 
that when an employer has foreseen a risk of psychiatric injury to employees exposed to (...) 
traum atic incidents, such inquiry is not foreseeable."
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reasonably foreseeable depends upon the facts of each particular case 
taking into account the size, resources, and demands made upon of the 
establishment. The fact that a medical counselling service has been set 
up in the establishment to give confidential advice to those who suffer 
from mental disorders may in some circumstances26 exonerate the em­
ployer from liability.
In Walker’s case, Coleman J. based his judgment by applying the 
known principles of employers’ liability. No mention was made in that 
case of the earlier House of Lords decision in Alcock v Chief Consta­
ble o f South Yorkshire Police27 which required that in psychiatric illness 
cases a restrictive approach had to be taken.28 In White v Chief Con­
stable o f Yorkshire Police29 an obiter dictum remark was made by Lord 
Hoffman which referred to Walker’s case where his lordship made 
a distinction between (a) claims emanating from the work itself and 
(b) those originating from seeing others being injured in the course of 
their employment.30 Although the decision in Walker had been ques­
tioned for a while, subsequent case law, and in particular Hatton, has 
accepted the reasoning of Coleman J. in Walker .31
26 But see Daw v Intel Corporation (U.K.) Ltd. [2007] 2 All E.R. 126 (C.A.) where the existence of 
a counselling service in the enterprise did not exonerate the employer from  liability. W hat the 
employer needed to do was to reduce Mr. Daw’s workload.
27 [1992] 1 A.C. 310 (H.L.).
28 See too Lord Steyns dictum  in White v Chief Constable o f South Yorkshire Police [1999] A.C. 
455 (C.A.) which indicated that claims made by employees against their employers in respect of 
psychiatric illnesses should be subject to the norm al rules of the tort of negligence which restrict 
the recovery of damages.
29 [1999] A.C.455 (C.A.).
30 It will be recalled that in White the House o f Lords held that the police officers who witnessed 
and helped the victims of the Hillsborough disaster and who consequently suffered psychiatric 
illnesses did not succeed in their claim against their employer.
31 See too CorrvI.B.C. [2008] 1 A.C. 844 (H.L.). See also the Law Commission Report No. 249 en­
titled “Liability for Psychiatric Illness” (1998) suggesting that the decision in Walker represented 
“(...)  a just development in the law” Parameters of space do not allow for further discussion. 
The reader may wish to consult some im portant cases heard in the field of psychiatric illnesses/ 
injuries which have not been m entioned in this chapter. They include Page v Smith [1996] A.C. 
155 (H.L.); Frost v Chief Constable o f South Yorkshire Police [1999] I.C.R. 216. (H.L.)’ Greatorex 
v Greatorex et al. [2000] 4 All E.R. 769 (QBD) and Majrowski v Guys and St. Thomas’ NHS Trust 
[2006] I.C.R. 1199 (H.L.).
